Intentionality as a Distinctive Feature of Mental Phenomena

Philosophic theories of mental images and perception are closely linked to the more general theory of intentionality. Broadly speaking, intentionality refers to the ability of human thought to be

Let us take, for example, a simple thought about my dog:

I BELIEVE MY DOG IS OUTSIDE.

At the moment I am have this thought, I am THINKING ABOUT SOMETHING and mind is directed toward an external object, namely, my dog. One might be tempted to say that this is quiet unremarkable. But other examples are more telling. Consider thinking about the properties of a square. Suppose, for example, that you think: "the diagonal of a square with a side of 1 is approxiimately 1.41." Such examples demonstrate our ability to have thoughts about abstract objects.

What accounts for the ability of the mind to direct itself to other objects? Can we say anything more about what is going on in the mind when we direct our thoughts in this way?

It seems obvious that there can not be a thought, a desire, or belief unless there is some OBJECT OF THOUGHT, desire or belief. Whatever the nature of the object and whatever the relation of the subject to the object (belief, desire), the object must be PRESENT to the mind. This circumstance has been variously described and interpreted, using a variety of technical terms that indicate the existence of distinctively mental items. Among the terms used:

Many philosophers have concluded that the existence of intentional objects is what defines the realm of the mental and what differentiates the mind from other entities. While a picture or a written sentence can exist without there being any minds, neither can exist as representations without there being a mind that can take them as objects (cf. Seppo and Kamppinen, p. 4). Human minds enable symbols to carry meaning, or have content.

It seems clear enough, then, that "something" is "in" our mind when we think about an object. This something, according to some accounts of intentionality, is an image, or "picture" of some object or possible state of affairs. Seppo and Kamppinen summarize this view of intentionality as follows:

By 'intentionality' we mean the ability of the human mind to refer to objects outside of itself. To put it bluntly, our view is that all mental states that contain in themselves a "picture" of an external object are intentional. (In medieval Latin, the word intentio meant, among other things, picture or idea.) When I see a cat I have a "picture" of the cat in my mind; when I wish it wouldn't rain tomorrow I have in my mind a "picture" of tomorrow's unwelcome rain and so on. (Seppo and Kamppinen, p. 1)

The theory of intentionality, however, itself has several difficulties. Moreover, introducing the notion of intentionality does not settle many of the important issues related to mental images. Among the questions remaining:

1. Do we NECESSARILY have AN IMAGE in mind when we think of a dog or a cat? For some standard reflections on this, see the section on thought imagery.

2. Do images refer? Do they carry content?