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This page contains the text of my work in progress, "The Nature of Visual Mental Images." This addresses advanced topics in mental imagery, particularly metaphysical issues, experimental techniques in contemporary empirical psychology, and computational models in cognitive psychology.
Information on citing these works
Overview of My Approach to Mental Images
Papers
Models of Size Information
A critique of computationally-inspired models of how object size
information is stored and retrieved. Argues that empirical
methods used to establish both Paivio's and Kosslyn's models can
not succeed because (1) the concept of size is ambiguous, and
(2), the experimental results are theoretically underdetermined.
Suggests that pure visual imagery can not be the form of stored
size information. Size information is multi-modal. Presently a
draft. Needs to have graphics inserted. Comments invited.
Mental Images as Mental Objects
An introduction to the metaphysics of mental images. Takes reader
from elementary observations about imagery, through a critical
discussion of descriptivism, to a metaphysical view about the
nature of visual mental images. A study in critical realism that
adapts Santayana's philosophy to mental images. Reproduced and
cited by several data base/search engines on the internet.
Excerpts from The Nature of Visual Mental Images
Abstract
Abstract of "The Nature of Visual Mental Images."
Preface
Preface to "The Nature of Visual Mental Images."
Explains purpose of work, main ideas, and structure of work. Only
5 pages.
Table of Contents
Analytical table of contents (all chapters) for "The Nature
of Visual Mental Images." Gives a nice overview of the
topics discussed.
Chapter 1 (complete)
A common sense approach to mental images is articulated, some
elementary philosophical objections are raised, and the course
for the subsequent investigation is set. First part is a good
introduction to problem of mental imagery, and should be
accessible to non-philosophers. Includes a chapter-by-chapter
summary of the entire work. Equivalent of about 15 double-spaced
pages.
Chapter 2 (selections)
Reviews the history of mental images from Aristotle through the
contemporary approach in both philosophy and psychology.
Separates history into two main camps: the imagist and the
descriptivist. Calls for a new approach that synthesizes the
insights of both camps. About 50 pages.
Chapter 3 (selections)
Develops an approach, using ideas from traditional psychology and
the definition of mental images provided by Alan Richardson in
psychology to develop an inventory of mental imagery types.
Concludes by showing how mental images are not so much explained
as described using both physiological and intentional terms, with
no clean separation. Concludes with some speculations about the
nature of mental objects in general. Includes a list of
desiderata for a theory of mental images.
Chapter 4
Pylyshyn and Kosslyn repeat the descriptivist and imagist
perspectives of previous times in the context of a new
understanding of psychology that is committed to
computationalism. But since computationalism (P) implies
epiphenomenalism (Q), and epiphenomenalism is false (not-Q),
computationalism must be wrong (by modus tollens). This is the
general form of argument I would like to support. I recognize the
weakness of this argument, however. I do not claim that this
argument goes through because I cannot actually prove that
epiphenomenalism is false. In a further attempt to demonstrate
the implausibility of computationalism, I also develop another
line of reasoning. I attempt to show that Pylyshyn's theory can
not provide a satisfactory account of the introspective evidence
we have of how visual memory actually works. According to
Pylyshyn's theory (or, I believe, any computational theory) ANY
computational process of absolutely any sort can correspond with
what we consciously experience. I find this absurd, but again I
can not prove it is impossible. Kosslyn attempts to salvage the
idea that images are NOT epiphenomenal. I show that his system
results in epiphenomenalism as well. This has the result that
Pylyshyn's and Kosslyn's theories are philosophically equivalent
as epiphenomenal systems. As such they do not address the very
phenomena at issue in the study of mental images: conscious
mental imagery states.
Chapter 5
Examines the experimental approach of Pylyshyn and Kosslyn. Shows
that the much-talked-about early experiments of Shepard and
Metzler and others suffer from underdetermination, platonizing
data, and failure to demonstrate cognitive impenetrability. Calls
for a new experimental approach in the tradition of psychology
prior to 1913.
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