III. BOHM: The Whole and the Implicate Order

A. Bohm's Life.  
     Understanding David Bohm's life will help us understand his philosophy. 
Bohm studied under Oppenheimer and completed his doctorate in 1943.  Bohm taught
at Princeton, where he wrote a book on quantum theory in 1951.  The work is still
considered one of the best treatments of the topic.  At Princeton Bohm had a series of
discussions with Einstein, who was opposed to what was to become the standard
dual-property, non-deterministic interpretation of quantum physics.  "God does not
play dice with the universe," Einstein said.  These conversations led Bohm to develop
a new interpretation of quantum mechanics, one more consistent with determinism. 
Bohm resurrected some suggestions made by deBroglie, who had developed a "hidden
variables" model in 1927, and in 1952, Bohm published his own model.
     During the McCarthy era, Bohm was called to testify before congress against
Oppenheimer.  Bohm refused, and though he was brought to trial and acquitted of
contempt of congress, he was fired by Princeton and spent the rest of his life as an
expatriate.  In 1961 Bohm met Krishnamurti, whose spiritual agenda and unique brand
of materialism influenced Bohm for the rest of his life.

B. Bohm's Critical Approach to the Physical Sciences.
     Though his thought is revolutionary, Bohm's analytical method is conservative. 
He accepts axioms that have served the physical sciences since the time of Gallileo: (1)
new empirical evidence should be treated with skepticism; (2) no new entities should
be postulated as explanatory constructs unless necessary; (3) the ontology presupposed
by the physical sciences should be changed only as a last resort.  As is well known,
quantum mechanics and relativity theory did force a change in the physical sciences
that impacted each of these axioms.  Initially   skeptics ruled the day when the
experimental evidence for these theories was presented.  Lorentz, for example, rejected
the idea that the Michelson-Morley experiment actually demonstrated the absence of
the ether in the universe.  Lorentz's interpretation was consistent with the experimental
data and kept the ontology of physics, which included the ether, static.  Likewise,
quantum physics challenged both the perfect predictability of physical phenomena and
the existence of descrete entities with clearly defined properties.  The most
widely-accepted resolution to the challenges of quantum mechanics, is that while the
gross pheomena of nature remain statistically predicable, certain sub-atomic
phenomena are unpredicable in their very nature and the entities responsible for these
changes have a dual nature: in certain circumstances they behave as particles, and in
others as waves.  The ontology of physics is now generally understood to include these
ambiguous entities.
     Bohm argued that this revolution in the physical sciences brought about by
quantum mechanics was inconsistent.  On the one hand, physics had, since Galileo and
Newton, been historically committed to ontological foundationalism: the belief that
there was a "bottom" to the physical sciences and that this foundation would not only
be discoverable, but would also be firmly based on the pure determinism of
mechanism and fully describable in terms of fundamental entities whose qualitative
transformations would be fully predictable by inflexible laws of nature. 
Foundationalism in physics, as Bohm put it, was committed to the belief that there is a
finite set of laws that "permit an exhaustive treatment of the whole of nature" (Bohm,
1957, p. 134).
     One the other hand, physics was now claiming to have discovered the bottom,
in the form of quantum mechanics, but at the same time it claimed that the ultimate
principles governing the fundamental entities were not fully predictable, but depended
on chance.
     In his 1957 book Causality and Chance, Bohm listed five criticisms of
contemporary physics (see Bohm, 1957, pp. 132-134).
1. If the prevailing interpretation of quantum physics were right, pure mechanism is
wrong.
2. The belief is foundationalism is not necessary for physics.  It is possible to have an
evolutionary view of knowledge in the physical sciences.
3. Foundationalism does not reflect a scientific attitude.  To accept any law as absolute
and final closes the door to further inquiry.
4. Experiment shows that physical laws apply to a range of phenomena only.  It is not
possible to establish experiments that cover every possible condition.
5. Although new laws appear to converge on "the truth," we have no reason to expect
that this will always happen.  New conditions may introduce new laws and new
physical qualities that are not expected.  We have no reason, other than blind belief, to
assume that there is a finite set of laws that "permit an exhaustive treatment of the
whole of nature" (Bohm, 1957, p. 134).

Bohm concluded, in my opinion correctly, that physicists should assume that the kinds
of significant qualities in the universe is unlimited.  The idea of the "qualitative
infinity of nature" is both scientifically and philosophically sound.  It opens the door to
further research, urging us to continue to discover more complex structures in nature. 
     At the same time, however, Bohm also realized that is was necessary to
preserve, as far as possible, some of the useful, conservative impulses that have guided
the history of physics.  Bohm employed a mixture of pragmatism and instrumentalism. 
He argued that although a proper scientific attitude implied an infinity of possibilities,
there is still a place for the notion of substances in nature: all things must have some
"degree of autonomy and stability in their modes of being"  (Bohm, 1957, p. 139). 
This is necessary (a) in order to allow things to preserve their identity for some time;
and (b) in order for things to be distinguished from other things.  After all, if "things"
do not "exist," it will be impossible to formulate laws that describe their qualitative
transformations under a range of experimental conditions.
     These experimental conditions establish simultaneously not only a set of
substances and their properties but also a set of background conditions that allow the
properties to be described.  That is to say, experimental conditions only capture an
aspect of a system.  But because there is, potentially, an infinite number of aspects to
the whole of nature,no system of determinate law can ever attain perfect validity.  For
every such system works with only a finite number of things (Bohm, 1957, p. 141). 
This system Bohm later called the Whole.  It alone was ultimately real.  Experimental
conditions, then, capture only a part of the Whole, and it is a always matter of
interpretation to decide which elements in an experimental condition are due to the
characteristics substances, and which are due some other aspect of the Whole that is
not captured by the experiment.
     When it comes to interpreting which aspects of experiments were due to
chance and which were due to laws, Bohm argued that we cannot always be sure. 
Might it not be that "chance" is simply used as an "explanation" to cover over what is
due to some undiscovered law that operates at a deeper level of the Whole?  Since we
may presume that the Whole has an infinite number of aspects, it is incumbent upon us
to consider such a possibility. 
     With these guidelines, Bohm sought to provide an interpretation of quantum
mechanics that he felt was both consistent with the history of physics (conservative)
and his idea of the Whole.  Before turning to Bohm's quantum interpretation, it may be
instructive to consider how Bohm's style of thinking might be applied to a more
familiar case.  (Be it noted, physicists may have a difficult time accepting this
analogy, finding it factually flawed; but that is irrelevant to the point of the analogy.)

C. The "Baseball" Analogy.
     Consider the path followed by a baseball when thrown from the pitcher's
mound to the catcher.  As everyone knows, the path followed by this baseball, all other
things being equal (such as air resistance, spin on the ball, and so on) is precisely
determined by the law of gravity.  The path of a thrown baseball is represented below.

  P ----> X      X
                                  X

                                                   X C
                                                   ^Catcher catches ball here.

Assume that scientists have investigated this phenomenon many times, and that the
law is verified each time and the predictions are always fulfilled.

Now let us suppose that we one day discover that although our predictions are always
fulfilled, if we measure more precisely we discover that the ball is in fact oscillating, in
a somewhat random
manner, during its flight.  The actual path, with all the positions filled in, is more like
that shown below.
                X
P ----> X        X        X    X    X
                           X             X     X
                              X                    X
                                                        X  X C
                                                              ^Catcher catches ball here.

There is one way to easily explain this phenomenon.  As a statistical generalization,
the average path of the ball still remains the same.  The "law" of gravity, as a
predicting tool, is not invalidated.  We do have, apparently, another, NEW
phenomenon that operates within the parameters of the "law" of gravity.  At present,
the source of these random variations is unexplained.

One might now object, anticipating our conclusion, that this is not at all what happens
in quantum physics.  At this point, it does not matter.  We are only concerned with
establishing that a "law" of motion may turn out to be a statistical average caused by
the influence of TWO factors: 
     1. a field of force, and
     2. random variations of an object moving within that field of force.
Let us change our thought experiment to more closely approximate the situation in
quantum mechanics.  Suppose we are now using what, for all practical purposes, seems
to be a very "baseball-like" object in similar experiments.  But we soon discover that
now the Catcher, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, actually is found to catch the
ball in different spots, even though it is pitched the same each time.  Sometimes he
catches it higher than expected, sometimes lower.

                X
P ----> X        X        X    X    X
                           X             X     X
                             X                    X     X < Catcher sometimes catches ball here
                                                     X  X <Catcher catches ball on average here 
                                                         X < Catcher sometimes catches ball here


Neither he nor anyone else is able to predict where the next ball will be caught.  There
is, however, a definite pattern to the scattering of his catching locations that is
statistically quite predictable.  His "average catching spot" remains very predicable.
     How can we explain this?  If you are inclined to say, "well, evidentially, the
ball-like object is oscillating somehow in accordance with the  application of some
force field, perhaps a new one," you have, essentially, followed Bohm's intuition. 
Observe, if you are inclined this way, that this is indeed a "natural" conclusion based
on our prior reasoning about the baseball oscillating   under the force of gravity and
producing a statistically valid result for the "law" of gravity.  Those unfamiliar with
quantum mechanics will be shocked to learn that this is not the position most
widely-accepted by physicists.  It is, rather, that some things are NOT and cannot be
expected to be anything like an ordinary ball.  These "things" behave as if they can be
either waves and particles.  In effect, the "tradition"of particles and fields is
overthrown, and we have a whole new ball game.  There are powerful reasons to
accept the standard version of quantum mechanics, which drastically changes the
fundamental ontology of physics.  However, as we have argued above, Bohm offers
some powerful reasons to question the style of thinking that results in the standard
interpretation.

D. Application of Principles to Quantum Mechanics and the Whole.
     Let us now follow Bohm's actual argument concerning the double slit
experiment that establishes the dilemma for quantum physics.  If at all possible, he
suggested, why not maintain the concepts of fields and particles?  The standard
interpretation of the double slit experiment is well known.  If a single slit is provided
between an electron source and a photographic plate, the distribution of results
matches what one would expect if electrons were particles randomly passing through
the slit at various trajectories.  When the experimental conditions change (when two
slits are provided), electrons do not pass randomly through one slit or the other; rather,
they create a distribution pattern on the photographic plate that corresponds to the
interference pattern of an electromagnetic wave source.  The standard interpretation
given to this was not, as one   might expect, that electrons have a single nature that
exists independently of these experimental conditions, but, usually, that either

(a) electrons are mathematical abstractions and only the experimental results, which
are determined only by statistical variations, exist; or
(b) that electrons may be said to exist as "dual-mode substances," but this assertion
must be understood as only having instrumental value consistent with option "a".
  
Bohm argued that the Schrodenger equation, used to predict the results of these
experiments as probabilistic outcomes, could be interpreted as a new species of a
traditional fields and particles.  If the particle is small enough (approximating a
mathematical point) and is subject to the effects of both a field that provides an
impetus in a general direction for a path in space, and random oscillations within that
field, then the path of the electron will follow a statistically predictable path (since its
path is determined by both a force and random variations with the path determined by
the force).  The situation at the subatomic level is analogous to the well-established
behavior of particles in fields at the level of gross matter, as demonstrated by the
example of Browniam Motion.  The trajectory of smoke particles is determined by the
force of gravity and the impact of molecules in the air.  The trajectory of the smoke
particles is therefore only statistically predicable and the apparently random variations
outside of the path determined by the force of gravity are due to unobserved particles. 
Bohm's reasoning is that something similar happens at the level of quantum reality.  A
force field, call it "the Quantum Force" (represented by the Schrodenger symbol,
psi-squared) acts on particles that are in turn also influenced by unobserved impacts (or
forces) from a layer of reality below.   Or, alternately (consistent with part of our
example of the baseball above), the field itself oscillates due to unknown reasons. 
Thus, parallelism both in method of explanation and ontology between the
macroscopic and  microscopic realms is maintained.  (See Table 1).
     An objection will, no doubt, be raised at this point.  We have included a hidden
realm (Alpha) that explains the phenomenal appearances of the subatomic realm.  If
we take Bohm seriously, there could be a realm beneath Alpha that explains its
phenomenal appearances, and so on through an infinite regress.  I am at present
uncertain of the applicability of this objection to Bohm's philosophy.  It is one thing to
say that there are levels of reality that support each other and another to say that the
ultimate reality is the Whole, and this includes many "levels" that remain unknown to
us.  I believe Bohm means to say the latter.
     However, the problem of the infinite regress, even if it can be solved, does not
remove a related objection to Bohm's philosophy.  As we have seen, he reintroduces
"substances" but Bohm's substances may appear to critics to be nothing more than
instrumental place holders; properties emerge not from them, but from levels of the
flux.  Nothing holds these properties together.  At best, they are like Hume's or
Buddhism's bundle of independently arising properties.  The hypothesis that these
properties "exist" independently, arising from the universal flux, is merely a cover
story for the inexplicable.
     Moreover, critics have pointed out that unless Bohm's theory can be disproved;
that is, unless there exist certain predictions belonging to the Bohm model and a
crucial experiment that can measure whether or not these predictions are borne out, the
theory remains a meaningless hypothesis.  Bohm's theory, critics will say, suffers from
too much flexibility.  Whatever new properties emerge in experimental situations, a
new level of Bohmian reality can be invented to cover the phenomena. 


CONCLUSION
     In spite of these powerful criticisms, I believe that we should examine Bohm's
ideas if for nothing else than the fact that the notion of the Whole brings us back to the
human situation.  In Bohm's view there is and can be no gap between the physical and
the mental.  Clearly, in his view, it is matter that thinks, and therefore matter must
have within it the capability of supporting human thought.  Indeed, all our actions,
thought, memories, and imaginings are part of the Whole.  In fact, some of it is
mechanical.  Bohm says:

  Thought is, in essence, the active response of memory in every phase of
  life.  We include in thought the intellectual, emotional, sensuous,
  muscular and physical responses of memory. (Bohm, 1980, p. 50)
  
  It is clear that thought, considered in this way as the response of
  memory, is basically mechanical in its order of operation. (Bohm, 1980,
  p. 50)

But some principle in the Whole must account for human creativity.  Chance, Bohm
argued, cannot account for it.  Bohm likened inspiration, or seeing that certain thoughts
are relevant to a given situation, to what he called "perception" rather than a
mechanical process:.

The perception of whether or not any particular thoughts are relevant or fitting requires
the operation of an energy that is not mechanical, an energy that we shall call
intelligence.  (Bohm, 1980, p. 51)

This process, or capability, of intelligence Bohm thought was the key to tying our
brains and the processes that occur in them to the rest of the universe.  These processes
are not separate.
  
Intelligence and material process have thus a single origin, which is ultimately the
unknown totality of the universal flux.  In a certain sense, this implies that what have
been commonly called mind and matter are abstractions from the universal flux, and
that both are to be regarded as different and relatively autonomous order within the one
whole movement." (Bohm, 1980, p. 53)
 
One might then suggest that in intelligent perception, the brain and nervous system
respond directly to an order in the universal and unknown flux..." (Bohm, 1980, p. 53)
  
Now, it may seem that we have come full circle.  This description of mind and matter
as abstractions, as relatively autonomous levels of one underlying reality which is
neither, sounds like property dualism.  But it is not.  These are not properties of the
brain, but manifestations of the Whole.  The Ideal Observer of reality that can discover
its fundamental laws has been swallowed up in the flux of reality itself.  Bohm's vision
here is Hegelian: the various stages of the absolute become manifest through the acts
of the Absolute itself and consciousness knows them by bringing itself into a form akin
to it.  Thus, our connectedness with the total human situation is preserved   and that is
the ultimate goal of any philosophical investigation.