Raytheon Watch

Its Not the Crime in the Streets,
Its the Crime in the Corporate Suites

Corporate Profile

THE "PATRIOTS" AT RAYTHEON

Updated and Revised Version of
the 1991 report by Jim Donahue
published by The Multinational Monitor

Updated and Revised by
J. Whitfield Larrabee

I. CONTENTS

Introduction
The Patriot Missile Deception
Corporate Crime and Punishment
Black Tuesday - Securities Fraud
Exploitation of Employees
Age Discrimination
Spying and Internet Censorship
Weapons Trafficking
Corporate Welfare
Environmental Concerns
Influence Peddling
Conclusion

II. INTRODUCTION

Raytheon Company's positive public image stands in stunning contrast to its criminal record, mistreatment of workers, sale of weapons to dictators, and abuse of corporate power. This profile highlights aspects of Raytheon's corporate profile that are glossed over in the company's own public statements and are invariably forgotten or ignored by major commercial media outlets.

III. THE PATRIOT MISSILE DECEPTION

The contrast between the image and reality of Raytheon was most glaring when the company was trumpeted as an outstanding defender of democracy during the Persian Gulf War because of its production of Patriot Missiles. In a public relations coup, President George Bush traveled to Raytheon's Patriot manufacturing plant in Andover, Massachusetts to thank his "friend," retiring Raytheon chairman Tom Phillips, and a large crowd of flag-waving workers for building what Bush called the "Scud Busters," a "triumph of American technology." Bush's accolades and the pictures of the cheering Raytheon family helped obscure the defense manufacturer's real record. The company has been stingy and coercive with its workers and has repeatedly attempted to defraud the federal government and taxpayers, where it gets about eighty percent of its business.

After war fever had subsided, it turned out that the Patriot's "triumph" against Iraq's Scud missile was a product of corporate, governmental and military propaganda. Critical assessments Patriot Missile performance revealed a pattern of deception by Raytheon, President Bush and the U.S. Army. The staff of the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security reported, "The Patriot missile system was not the spectacular success in the Persian Gulf War that the American public was led to believe. There is little evidence to prove that the Patriot hit more than a few Scud missiles launched by Iraq during the Gulf War, and there are some doubts about even these engagements. The public and the Congress were misled by definitive statements of success issued by administration and Raytheon representatives during and after the war." In the heat of war, George Bush had publicly claimed virtually a 100% success rate for Patriot/Scud interception in a speech at the Patriot factory in Andover, Massachusetts. Yet, in Raytheon's own response to critical statements on the WGBH Television Frontline web site, it claimed that the actual success rate against incoming Scuds in Israel was no more than 40%. Recent scientific assessments have further undercut the inflated claims made by Raytheon, Bush and the Army. See Technical Debate over Patriot Performance in the Gulf War.

Nevertheless, Raytheon and the Bush administration were quick to hype the Patriot as a great success story in order to build support for continued government expenditures on high-tech weaponry and to certify that the world's largest peacetime military buildup was not in vain. For example, after citing the success of the Patriot in his State of the Union address, President Bush re-affirmed his commitment to the costly Strategic Defense Initiative. Similarly, Raytheon spokesperson Ed Powers told Multinational Monitor that the Patriot's performance proves that "high-tech electronics is a cost- effective way" to defend the United States.

IV. CORPORATE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

Raytheon's criminal record demonstrates that it is not guided by the "patriotism" heralded by its famous missile, but rather, buy a ruthless dedication to corporate greed.

Perhaps no greater danger exists to the national security of the United States than the proliferation of nuclear weapons. To discourage this proliferation, the United States imposed economic sanctions against Pakistan for its 1998 nuclear testing. Because these sanctions threatened to harm Raytheon's bottom line, Raytheon attempted to complete a prohibited sale of satellite communications equipment by channeling the sale through its Canadian subsidiary, according to U.S. News and World Report. If Raytheon doesn't strike a plea bargain, a federal grand jury is expected to hand down indictments.

Such criminal activity is an ongoing pattern at Raytheon. In March 1990, Raytheon pleaded guilty to one felony count of illegally obtaining classified Air Force budget and planning documents. U.S. District Judge Albert V. Bryan,Jr. imposed a $10,000 criminal fine for one felony count of "conveyance without authority" and $900,000 in civil penalties and damages. The case may have barely touched the surface of Raytheon's criminal behavior. Although the plea only involved 1983 Air Force documents, U.S. Attorney Henry Hudson said Raytheon also illegally obtained a wide range of secret Pentagon documents from 1978 to 1985. The documents gave Raytheon an unfair edge against its competitors in bidding for defense contracts. Ironically, only months before its guilty plea, Raytheon's publishing company, D.C. Heath & Co., the sixth largest publisher of school textbooks in the United States, published the "Defense Procurement Mess" by William Gregory. The essay argues that defense contractor crime and indiscretion is the result of excessive government regulation and oversight, not corporate greed.

Raytheon has been embroiled in an assortment of other litigation involving fraudulent conduct. On May 12, 1999, Reuters reported that Raytheon "will pay $3 million to a competitor, AGES Group, and purchase $13 million worth of AGES aircraft parts to settle allegations that a security firm [Wackenhut Corp.] hired by Raytheon eavesdropped on and stole documents from AGES. " AGES also alleged that stolen confidential pricing documents were turned over to Raytheon. Based on reports in the Boston Herald, the stolen documents appeared to be trade secrets protected by federal law. The settlement was exceptional in that the parties agreed that judgment would be entered against Raytheon, legally establishing the validity of AGES' law suit. Civil suits are almost always settled by means of a "stipulation of dismissal" in exchange for the payment of money. In these cases, defendants do not admit to being liable or agree to the entry of judgment, and are free to disclaim liability [The above photo shows a "shotgun microphone," one of the listening devices allegedly used by Wackenhut spies].

Reuters reported, "AGES filed suit against Raytheon in federal court in Alabama in 1996 over a $450 million contract to service C-12 and U-21 military aircraft. Both Raytheon and AGES were vying for the contract, which Raytheon had held for decades but which AGES won in 1996, the Herald said. AGES alleged that the security firm Wackenhut Corp. (WAK - news), hired by Raytheon, used video and audio surveillance to spy on a consulting firm hired by AGES to help it prepare its bid, the Herald said. "

Published allegations suggest that Raytheon and Wakenhut violated federal criminal laws against electronic eavesdropping and the theft of trade secrets (National Stolen Property Act ("NSPA"), 18 U.S.C. 2314-2315). However, the Justice department under the Clinton administration has been docile in pursuing fraud by military contractors, and this writer could not find any evidence that a criminal investigation was even initiated. (See RAYTHEON IMPLICATED IN DOCUMENTS THEFT, SPYING AND EAVESDROPPING).

In November of 1995, a wiretap of Julio Cesar Gomes dos Santos, a special advisor to the Brazilian President Fernando Enrique Cardoso, indicated that Raytheon's lobbyist may have bribed a senator to gain backing for a $1.4 billion dollar radar project. According to transcripts published by the Brazilian weekly Isto E, Brazilian police wiretapped a telephone conversation between Gomes dos Santos and Raytheon's operative in Brazil, Jose Afonso Assumpcão. When Assumpcão told Gomes dos Santos that Brazilian Senator Gilberto Miranda might block the Raytheon contract, Gomes dos Santos responded, "Damn, did you already pay this guy?" Assumpcão had also curried favor with Gomes dos Santos with a series of "gifts." Gomes dos Santos and Brazil's aviation minister were forced to resign because of the bribery scandal and their close association with Assumpcão. If bribery of foreign officials were established, Raytheon could be charged with criminally violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

In October of 1994, Raytheon Co. paid $4 million to settle a US government claim that the company inflated a defense contract for antimissile radar. The PAVE PAWS system was designed to detect incoming submarine-launched ballistic missiles. PAVE PAWS stands for Precision Acquisition Vehicle Entry Phased Array Warning System. The government claimed in a federal lawsuit that Raytheon inflated a contract to upgrade two of four PAVE PAWS sites by proposing to hire higher-skilled employees than were necessary for the job. If an employee had prevailed on these charges under the federal False Claims Act, he or she would have been entitled to between 15% and 30% of the funds recovered for the government.

Just one year earlier, on October 14, 1993, Raytheon paid $3.7 million to settle allegations that it misled the Defense Department by overstating the labor costs involved in manufacturing Patriot missiles. The Justice Department said Raytheon failed to disclose that less skilled, lower-paid workers could produce the weapons, which gained fame as an "effective" weapon during the Persian Gulf war. ''The recovery of this money is yet another warning to contractors that the Truth in Negotiations Act's information disclosure requirements will be strictly and sternly enforced,'' Frank Hunger, assistant attorney general, said in a statement.

In October 1987, the Justice Department signed on to a $36 million suit which alleged that Raytheon submitted false claims for work done on missiles. Originally filed by Karel Schwarzkopf, a former Raytheon employee, the suit alleged that, from 1979 to 1983, Raytheon overcharged the government, diverted materials and submitted bills for repair work never done. The Justice Department eventually closed the case, citing a lack of evidence. However, the real reason the government dropped the case, according to John Phillips, a Los Angeles attorney who represented Schwarzkopf until the government took over, was that it "decided basically that it was just too much effort [to prosecute Raytheon] for the dollars at stake." Although he concedes that some of the allegations in the suit "turned out not to be accurate," he says that the main problem was that the more promising allegations involved cost-accounting methods and became "extremely labor-intensive" to prosecute, requiring "a tremendous amount of review of time sheets" and other documents.

V. BLACK TUESDAY - SECURITIES FRAUD

On Tuesday, October 12, 1999, Raytheon common stock plummeted Raytheon's Class A shares fell $19-1/2, or approximately 46 percent, from $42 to $22-1/2. Additionally, Raytheon's Class B shares plunged from $43 on October 11, 1999, to close at $24-1/4 on October 12, 1999, a drop of $18-3/4, or 44 percent. This crash represented a loss of about $8 billion in market value in a single day. Worse yet, earlier in the year, Raytheon's stock had traded at nearly $75.

http://www.gis.net/~larrabee/raytheonstock.htm

(the above link provides additional commentary)

The plunge in stock prices was triggered by a Wall Street Journal report that Raytheon was over cost or behind schedule on more than a dozen fixed-price defense contracts. The Journal reported that Raytheon is behind on its lucrative Tomahawk cruise missiles, P-3 Orion patrol aircraft and RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft programs. It also reportedly was having trouble with the shoulder-held Javelin missile, the Navy Extremely High Frequency Satellite Communications program and the conversion of a military plant in Umatilla in northern Oregon for commercial use.

According to Reuters, CEO Daniel Burnham told analysts that he'd been working to reform a culture at Raytheon where managers think in terms of what they hope to deliver, rather than what is realistic. "We've told people, 'Tell us what's going on here. Don't hide behind hope,'" Burnham said. "This has been clearly a big wakeup call to a lot of people.''
Contrary to Burnham's suggestions, Raytheon's managers were not hiding behind hope -- they were hiding out of fear. Raytheon fosters a claustrophobic and tyrannical culture in which managers are rightly fearful that an excess of honesty will get them fired, as it has in the past.

As a result of the loss in market value and the company's actions, a slew of shareholder securities fraud class action lawsuits were filed against Raytheon and its officers.

http://www.gis.net/~larrabee/classaction.htm

(detailed information on these class action lawsuits)

The lawsuits included allegations that Raytheon and two of the company's senior officers omitted to disclose in its financial statements that it was violating Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (``GAAP'') by engaging in a systematic contract ``acceleration'' policy, under which the Company was prematurely recording revenue on contingent sales contracts prior to actual performance. As a result, the Company's 1997 and 1998 revenues were materially overstated in violation of GAAP and its financial results for the period were materially inflated. Suits also alleged that Raytheon omitted to disclose in its financial statements that the Company was behind schedule and experiencing significant cost overruns on several fixed price defense contracts, which led to Raytheon taking a significantly higher material charge against 1999 third quarter earnings than was previously announced. Raytheon allegedly issued a series of materially false and misleading statements during the Class Period (March 30, 1998 and October 11, 1999, inclusive) in order to conceal negative trends in the Company's business to support the company's acquisition of several companies using company stock as consideration.

On May 13, 2004 Raytheon reported that it had reached a preliminary agreement to pay $410 million in cash and securities to settle these consolidated class-action lawsuits. This settlement constitutes one of the top 10 settlements of securities fraud lawsuits in U.S history.

VI. EXPLOITATION OF EMPLOYEES

In its home state of Massachusetts and throughout the world, Raytheon has a strong record for exploiting workers. Typical of the company's iron fisted tactics was its treatment of workers on the Caribbean island of Andros, Bahamas. Raytheon took over a base on the island in April 1997, according to the Miami Heral, cutting salaries and eliminating retirement contributions. That prompted many workers to leave, and some of the ones left behind say that forced them into picking up the slack with no promise of overtime. Morale was so bad that Raytheon employees, a group thick with military veterans, voted in January to form a union and stage a walkout in the last two weeks of March. Raytheon managers fired the union's president, Chris Kirkland, on March 6, apparently in an effort to stifle the union organizing, but remaining employees say they intend to continue taking steps to make the union a formal entity under Bahamian law.

In October of 1994, Raytheon announced plans to lay off all 870 employees at two aircraft plants in England that it had purchased from British Aerospace. The long and loyal service of the employees didn't count for anything with Raytheon, which was only concerned with profits. Union officials at the two aircraft plants indicated that workers had cut overhead by 25 percent and had increased productivity by a third. The Labour party said in a resolution that ''Eight hundred skilled workers are to be thrown on the dole despite a promise that their jobs were safe for many years to come.''

In its home state of Massachusetts, where it is one of the largest employers, its workers are represented by three unions: the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), the International Association of Machinists (IAM) and the Raytheon Guards Association. Although Raytheon enjoyed years of record profits in the eighties, it used its economic might to foist a portion of health insurance costs onto its workers. In 1989, the IBEW agreed to a two-year concessionary contract which requires workers to pay a half percentage of their wages for an individual health plan or one percent of their wages for a family health plan. Today, all Raytheon employees pay a part of their health insurance. Spokeman Ed Powers said that employee contributions to the health plan were justified, regardless of the corporation's record earnings, because health costs "have been rising dramatically." In 1988, Raytheon refused to recognize democratically elected unions at its plants in Manchester and Pelham, New Hampshire, where non-union guards voted to join the Raytheon Guards Association. Raytheon disputed the certification of the election by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) on a frivolous charge that the certification was "improper." In November 1990, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld an NLRB ruling that found Raytheon in violation of U.S. Labor law. The court forced Raytheon to bargain with the guards' elected union.

In 1995, Raytheon used its financial power to coerce a $21 million annual tax cut out of the small state of Massachusetts, where it is based, by threatening to move its operations elsewhere. True to form, only six months after being granted this tax relief, the company announced plans to cuts its payroll in the state by up to 4,400 employees. The cuts have continued to the present. In October of 1998, the company announced plans to cut 400 jobs at its Andover plant. Raytheon's ruthless demands for special tax breaks resulted in a stampede of banks, mutual funds, manufacturers, insurance companies and other corporations demanding similar treatment, resulting in a total annual tax loss to the state of up to $170 million according to a report by The Century Foundation. Massive reductions in employment occurred at Raytheon facilities Massachusetts throughout the 1990's, culminating with the corporation's November 1999 announcement that it would sell a facility in Quincy, Massachusetts, putting hundreds of employees out of work and severely harming the economic outlook for this blue collar community.

Much of the impact of Raytheon's actions is linked to "globalization" efforts that Raytheon has led, which allow the company to conduct business in areas where labor has few rights and environmental regulations are lax.

As a leader in the fight for corporate freedom, Raytheon was a leader in pushing the "North American Free Trade Agreement" (NAFTA) through Congress, contributing at least $60,000 to NAFTA-USA, the national organization pushing the treaty. As part of its push for NAFTA, Raytheon had a program to "educate" its work force nationwide as to the benefits of NAFTA. In October and November of 1993, on company time, Raytheon workers were paid to listen to a presentation explaining why the company supported the proposed pact. The employees didn't apparently learn their lessons very well. On November 10, 1993, several hundred members of Raytheon's electrical union gathered outside of its Waltham, Massachusetts plant to protest against NAFTA.

More than 200,000 U.S. workers have been certified as of October 1998 under one special NAFTA unemployment program, NAFTA Transitional Adjustment Assistance (NAFTA TAA). These workers represent only a fraction of the total U.S. jobs lost due to NAFTA. The NAFTA TAA program provides job training and income support to workers who meet very narrow criteria. Only workers who know about and choose to apply for the program are even considered, and only certain types of workers in certain types of companies can qualify.

As companies have shifted work to sweat shops in third world countries, major trade readjustments have occurred. For example, the $1.7 billion U.S. trade surplus with Mexico in 1993 was transformed into an annual trade deficit of $17.5 billion by 1996.

In 1987, California's Fair Employment and Housing Commission found Raytheon's Goleta, CA plant guilty of illegal discrimination for firing an employee who had AIDS. Although a doctor told Raytheon the employee could return to work without posing a risk to other employees, corporation managers feared that coworkers would "catch" the AIDS virus. The Commission ordered the corporation to rehire the employee and pay him $6,000 in back wages. The Commission's ruling came too late, however, since by this time the employee was dead.

VII. AGE DISCRIMINATION

As Raytheon has laid off workers in the U.S., older employees have complained that they were terminated because of their age. Some employees have also complained that they were denied raises because of their age.

In 1994, Raytheon substantially reduced the protections given to older workers.

Suits have been filed, and more than 20 employees in Massachusetts alone have filed age discrimination complaints against the company with Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination since 1995. One employee alleged that, begining in 1994, managers began making statements such as "We want to create a new company, with new blood."

Age discrimination is prohibited under federal law pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Many states also have laws prohibiting age discrimination.

VIII. SPYING AND INTERNET CENSORSHIP

In October of 1998, Raytheon filed suit in Massachusetts Superior Court against 21 "John Does" who had posted messages on a Yahoo message board devoted to Raytheon. Using the powerful "discovery" tools allowed to parties in civil litigation, Raytheon was able to subpoena information from Yahoo and internet service providers that enabled it to identify individuals using the Yahoo message board service with anonymous online "handles." Although Raytheon alleged that the John Does had disclosed proprietary information obtained in the course of their employment with the company, much of the information was a matter of the public record. The inquiry had the air of a witch hunt. 4 employees were reportedly discharged, and the rest were apparently spoken to with the threat of discharge. Raytheon Watch decried this spying on employees on its web site and in press releases. The prospect of huge corporations spying on their employees and filing suit against them in order to force them to be silent promises to bring about a brave new world of corporate censorship.

http://www.gis.net/~larrabee/yahoo.htm

(more information on this case)

IX. WEAPONS TRAFFICKING

The United States' provided a great service to Saudi Arabia in disabling Iraq's oil production capacity in the 1991 bombings, thereby excluding one of the largest producers of oil from an already flooded marked. In appreciation for this service, the Saudi Arabian dictatorship made massive arms purchases from U.S. weapons manufacturers in the early and mid 1990's. Raytheon enjoyed major benefits from these sales, including orders for Sidewinder heat-seekers, Hughes Maverick air-to-surface missiles, and jointly made Sparrow radar-guided missiles. Although critics warned that weapons sales to the Saudi dictators could stimulate regional insecurities and encourage a fundamentalist uprising, the Saudi dictators were able to ignore rampant social inequalities and continue their weapons purchases by dealing with political opponents with an iron fist. As the bottom continued to fall out on the oil market, weapons sales to the Saudi dictators have falling off, but have been more than replaced through massive increases in military spending, including expenditures on bombings in Kosovo and Iraq and on Anti-ballistic missile programs.

In April of 1999, Raytheon reported that it expected to see a windfall from increased Pentagon spending, implying that increased orders for missiles used in the bombing of the former Yugoslavia would aid profits. CEO Daniel Burnham told a military industry conference, "We are restricted in what we can say about activities in Yugoslavia, but perhaps you have read that the Department of Defense has submitted a supplemental request for congressional approval (and) as an example, the Navy has requested about $113 million to accelerate the remanufacture of 324 Tomahawks.'' The United States has used Raytheon made Tomahawk cruise missiles to bomb Yugoslav and Iraqi targets. The Raytheon AMRAAM air-to-air missile, costing $386,000 each, and other missiles, have also been used in Yugoslavia.

X. CORPORATE WELFARE

On March 11, 1999, Defense Secretary Cohen announced that Egypt would be "buying" the most advanced model of the Patriot anti-missile battery. The weapons transfer actually involves a taxpayer funded gift to Egypt and corporate welfare for Raytheon. The United States provides Egypt with $1.2billion annually in military aid, which includes training programs, weapons and spare parts. U.S. defense officials said the new multi-year weapons purchase would be financed out of the military aid Egypt gets annually from the United States. The $1.3 billion Patriot deal involves the Patriot 3 model of a system that drew attention during the Persian Gulf War when it was allegedly used against Iraqi Scud missiles. Egypt plans to buy a single missile defense battery composed of eight, boxcar like missile firing units — a total of 32 missiles.

XI. ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS

Despite evidence that incineration is the worst option for destroying the
nation's obsolete chemical weapons stockpile at the Umatilla Army Depot, the Oregon Environmental Quality Commission (EQC) gave the
green light to the Army and Raytheon Corporation to spend $1.3 billion of taxpayer money to construct five chemical weapons incinerators. Despite strong protests, on February 7, 1997, the EQC made its final decision to accept the United States Army's application to build a chemical weapons incineration facility near Hermiston, Oregon.

Some examples of the chemicals to be incinerated include nerve gas and mustard agent; bioaccumulative organochlorines such as dioxins, furans, chloromethane, vinyl chloride, and PCBs; metals such as lead, mercury, copper and nickel; and toxins such as arsenic. These represent only a fraction of the thousands of chemicals and metals that will potentially be emitted throughout the Columbia River watershed and from the toxic ash and effluents which pose a significant health threat via entrance to the aquifer.

Contrary to what incineration advocates claim, there is no urgent need to incinerate, since the stockpile at Umatilla has small potential for explosion or chain reaction as a result of decay. A 1994 General Accounting Office report estimates that the actual number of years for safe weapons storage is 120 years rather than the 17.7 years originally estimated by the National Research Council. Thus, the timeline foraction could conceivably be lengthened until all the alternatives-such as chemical neutralization, molten metals, electro-chemical oxidation, and solvated electron technology (SET)-are considered. A delay is supported by a National Academy of Sciences report, entitled Review and Evaluation of Alternative Chemical Disposal Technologies, which states that there has been sufficient development to warrant re-evaluation of alternative technologies for chemical agent destruction.

Corporations with more than 10 employees operating in the United States are required to report to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the release of more than 320 chemicals that are classified by the EPA as toxic to human health or inflict a serious adverse effect on the environment. The following chart lists the amount of toxic chemicals released into the air or water and/or onto the ground by Raytheon in 1988. Included in the list of released chemicals were the following known or probable carcinogens: nickel, chromium, tetrachloroethylene and dichloromethane. State Amount Arkansas 55,100 pounds California 18,251 Connecticut 39,600 Illinois 11,100 Iowa 313,950 Kansas 102,950 Kentucky 31,366 Massachusetts 2,057,216 New York 49,500 Ohio 4,250 Oklahoma 750 Pennsylvania 68,175 Rhode Island 94,211 Tennessee 568,637 TOTAL 3,415,056 .

XII. INFLUENCE PEDDLING

Raytheon maintains an in house lobbying staff of at least 19 full time employees. It also employs at least five outside lobbying firms and spends and budgets at least $1.6 million annually for lobbying.

http://www.gis.net/~larrabee/Ratco97lobby.htm

(for more detailed information on its lobbying activities)

According to the non-partisan Center For Responsive Politics, Raytheon made $818,874 in soft money contributions in the 1997-98 election cycle.

Company managers and employees keep the coffers of pliable politicians filled to overflowing though campaign contributions.

http://www.gis.net/~larrabee/RatcoMoney.htm

(view the above link for a detailed list of these contributions)

XIII. CONCLUSION

Through the use of sophisticated public relations techniques, a powerful lobbying campaign, and a flood of money to politicians, Raytheon has been able to pursue a course of widespread corruption while maintaining a postitive public image, and while incurring negligible costs.

This corrupt corporate environment may have led to excessively bold manipulation of SEC disclosures, a resulting loss of investor confidence and plummeting stock values. Even the massive decline in market value will not result in the type of revolutionary change that would be necessary to create an ethical and legal environment at the company. Outside law enforcement and political pressure for reform is minimal at the present time. The company's future success is heavily dependant on its ability to command high levels of military spending and destablizing foreign weapon sales. In the post Cold War environment, political support for these policies is uncertain. Severe problems in the company's ethical foundation and probable ongoing criminal enterprises promise continued instability for this company.

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