Dissertation Abstract

Within contemporary democratic theory, liberals and anti-liberals alike mark out their position for a progressive politics with respect to Jürgen Habermas' theory of communicative action and discourse ethics. But his theory has been fundamentally misunderstood by both sides. The standard reading of Habermas supposes him an ardent rationalist and a defender of a neo-Kantian concept of autonomy. In my dissertation, I argue, contrary to the now standard interpretation, that the theory of communicative action does not merely entail democratic procedure, but also offers implicitly a theory of the production of meaning and solidarity.

I show how Habermas backfills his theory of communicative rationality with a substantive accommodation among participants by reintroducing into the concept of rationality its ancient Greek complicity with mimetic power. Habermas' innovative rendering of a specifically communicative rationality poses mimesis as productive of an articulate, affective binding effect in communication. Properly understood, Habermas' theory must be viewed not as rationalist but as a positive reconstruction of the classical debate between critical theory and mimesis. To explicate the role of mimetic power in communicative action, I reconstruct Habermas' concept of communicative rationality as extending Walter Benjamin's project of profane illumination. I develop this reading of communicative rationality over three main chapters concerning Habermas' appropriation of Plato (mimesis), G.H. Mead (identity-formation), Walter Benjamin and Hans-Georg Gadamer (aesthetic experience).

My project contributes to current debates on fundamental philosophical concepts in contemporary political theory, principally in terms of how moral theory and aesthetic theory illuminate the politics of subject-formation and political solidarity.

[home]